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Until the United
States Regul ates Tech
Exports, It Will
Continue to Enable
China's Surveill ance
of the Uyghurs
by Alexandra Haris*

Introduction
For decades, China has oppressed its Uyghur
population, a mostly Muslim, Turkic-speaking
ethnic group in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region, including through acts of genocide.1 China
perpetuates genocidal acts through its policies of

* Alexandra (“Lex”) Haris is a 2L at American University Washington College of Law where she is the Senior Articles Editor for
the Human Rights Brief and a Junior Staffer for the Administrative Law Review. She is a Research Assistant for the Project on
Addressing Prison Rape, and hopes to be a public defender upon
graduation.
1
When this Article refers to genocide, it means: “ . . . killing
members of [a] group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children
of the group to another group.” Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948. There
is broad consensus among human rights experts that China’s
actions constitute acts of genocide. See ‘Eradicating Ideological
Viruses’: China’s Campaign of Repression against Xinjiang’s Muslims, Hum. Rts. Watch (Sept. 9, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/
report/2018/09/09/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs; see also Raoul Wallenberg
Centre for Human Rights, The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China’s Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention,
Newlines Institute (March 2021).
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detaining members of the Uyghur population, which
rely on U.S.-exported technologies.2 Investigations
conducted by human rights groups and international
media indicate that the Chinese government
implements U.S.-exported technology in the Xinjiang
region to track and analyze individuals within the
Uyghur population’s movements and behavior in real
time to identify persons to investigate and potentially
send to internment camps.3 For example, Xinjiang’s
cities and villages have been split into squares of 500
people, each square equipped with a police station to
regularly scan individuals’ identification cards, take
their photographs and fingerprints, and search their
cell phones.4 This information is gathered and sent to
a database known as the Integrated Joint Operations
Platform, which creates a list of “suspicious people”
to send to internment camps.5 In November 2019,
the International Consortium of Investigative
Journalists revealed classified Chinese government
documents that showed in just one week in 2017,
fifteen thousand members of the Uyghur population
who were placed in detention centers after being
flagged by the Integrated Joint Operations Platform.6
The surveillance state the Chinese government has
created is restraining liberty and privacy, thereby,
persecuting the Uyghur community.7
While private Chinese companies provide
monitoring technology, such as facial recognition
software, to the Chinese government, these
Chris Buckley & Paul Mozur, How China Uses High-Tech
Surveillance to Subdue Minorities, N.Y. Times (May 22, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/world/asia/china-surveillance-xinjiang.html.
3
See id.; see also Paul Mozur, One Month, 500,000 Face Scans:
How China is Using AI to Profile a Minority, N.Y. Times (Apr.
14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/technology/
china-surveillance-artificial-intelligence-racial-profiling.html.
4
Lindsay Maizland, China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang,
Couns. Foreign Rel. (March 1, 2021), https://www.cfr.org/
backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
“Break their Lineage, Break their Roots” China’s Crimes
against Humanity Targeting Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims, Hum. Rts. Watch (April 19, 2021), https://www.hrw.org/
report/2021/04/19/break-their-lineage-break-their-roots/chinas-crimes-against-humanity-targeting#.
2
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companies import surveillance technology from U.S.based corporations.8 For example, major Chinese
government-owned companies—namely Hikvision
and Dahua9—have ties to Amazon, Apple,10 Hewlett
Packard, and Intel.11 Through these contracts, these
U.S.-based corporations profit from China’s use of
technology to surveil Uyghur persons.12
The United States has an opportunity to block U.S.
corporations’ roles in the Chinese government’s
surveillance. China does not have the capacity to
develop certain technologies that U.S. companies
provide, such as Intel chips that are required to
power China’s supercomputing centers.13 If the
U.S. government were to legally prohibit U.S.
corporations from providing this technology, China
would be unable to surveil Uyghurs persons with the
same level of sophistication as it currently does.14 As
a State Party to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“the
Convention”),15 the United States has an obligation
Roseanne Gerin & Alim Seytoff, US Tech Products Enable
Chinese Surveillance in Xinjiang, Researchers Find, Radio Free
Asia (Aug. 5, 2021), https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/
us-tech-products-08052021185345.html.
9
John Honovich, Hikvision and Dahua Sanctioned for Human
Rights Abuses, IPVM (Oct. 7, 2019), https://ipvm.com/reports/
sanction-hikua.
10
Brendon Hong, Amazon Partner in China Is Making Facial-Recognition Tech to Track Uighurs, Daily Beast (Nov. 13,
2020), https://www.thedailybeast.com/dahua-amazon-partnerin-china-is-making-facial-recognition-tech-to-track-uyghurs.
11
Alex Ward, 5 Real Steps the US Could Take to Help Uighurs in China, Vox (Jul. 28, 2020), https://www.vox.
com/2020/7/28/21337081/china-uighurs-muslims-trumpforced-labor-help.
12
EU Companies Selling Surveillance Tools to China’s Human
Rights Abusers, Amnesty Int’l (Sep. 21, 2020), https://www.
amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/09/eu-surveillance-sales-china-human-rights-abusers/.
13
See Paul Mozur & Don Clark, China’s Surveillance State
Sucks Up Data. U.S. Tech is Key to Sorting It, N.Y. Times (Nov.
22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/22/technology/
china-intel-nvidia-xinjiang.html (explaining chips made by
American semiconductor company Intel have been powering a
Uyghur supercomputer tracking complex since 2016).
14
Ward, supra note 11.
15
See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S.
277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
8
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to prevent U.S. corporations’ roles in perpetuating
genocide against the Uyghur minority group. 16
Under Article V, the United States has an obligation
to enact legislation necessary to effectuate the
Convention’s provisions to prevent genocide. 17 The
United States is failing to meet this duty because
it has only used verbal condemnation and limited
domestic restrictions on trade with certain entities.18

I. Denunciations and Entity List Pl acements
Are Not Enough

It is well-documented that the U.S. government
knows that China continues to track, systematically
incarcerate, and execute Uyghur persons.19 However,
the response—diplomatic statements and actions
condemning China’s repression of Uyghur persons—
does not fulfill its aforementioned duty under Article
V of the Convention.
The United States began responding to China on
this issue in 2019 when the Trump administration
placed Chinese technology companies, such as
Hikvision and Dahua, on the U.S. Department of
Commerce’s Entity List, intending to bar China from
receiving U.S. technological imports.20 When the
See id., art. V. (listing the duties as “Contracting Parties
undertake to enact . . . the necessary legislation to give effect to
the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to
provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide of any
of the other acts enumerated in article III.”).
17
See id.
18
See infra note 23 (explaining how the United States placed
Chinese corporations on the Entity List, which is a domestic
trade restriction list, but does not prohibit U.S. citizens or companies from working with them).
19
Priyanka Boghani, How the U.S. Has Reacted to China’s Treatment of Uyghurs, Pub. Broad. Serv. (Nov. 10, 2020), https://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/us-reacted-china-treatment-uyghurs/; see Hong, supra note 9. The U.S. government
has also shown awareness through proposed legislation, proposing a resolution in 2020 to recognize China’s actions against
Uyghurs as genocidal. S. Res. 760, 166th Cong. (2020); see also
Rebecca Wright, Ivan Watson, Zahid Mahmood, and Tom
Booth, ‘Some are just Psychopaths’: Chinese Detective in Exile
Reveals Extent of Torture Against Uyghurs, CNN (Oct. 5, 2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/04/china/xinjiang-detective-torture-intl-hnk-dst/index.html.
20
Id.
16
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United States placed Hikvision and Dahua on the
Entity List, it demonstrated its explicit knowledge
of the situation for Uyghur persons by stating that
the companies were “implicated in human rights
violations and abuses in China’s campaign targeting
U[y]ghurs.”21 However, the Entity List placement
was ineffective; shortly after, Dahua participated in a
security trade show in Las Vegas, Nevada, and later
struck a $10 million deal with Amazon for thermal
cameras.22 Following the failed attempt to sanction
these private companies, the Trump administration
condemned China in June 202023 and January 202124
in presidential statements, and Biden administration
followed suit in March 2021.25 That said, there has
recently been a movement within U.S. Congress to
pressure the government to act more forcefully.26
Congress has pressured the U.S. government
to bolster its export controls because previous
denunciations and policies have failed to thwart
Uyghur surveillance and China’s committing of
genocidal acts.27 As of March 2021, NBC News
reported that China is “expanding and entrenching
a system for mass detention”28 in an effort to sterilize
Uyghur women.29 Additionally, through a Dahua
Id.
Id.
23
Patrice Taddonio, U.S. Enacts New Law Condemning China’s
Treatment of Uyghur and Other Muslims, Pub. Broad. Serv.
(June 18, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/us-enacts-new-law-condemning-chinas-treatment-of-uyghurand-other-muslims/.
24
Boghani, supra note 19.
25
Dareh Gregorian & Abigail Williams, Biden Admin Sanctions
Chinese Officials for Abuses Against Uyghurs, NBC News (Mar.
22, 2021), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/
biden-admin-announces-sanctions-against-chinese-officialsover-human-rights-n1261745.
26
Kate O’Keeffe, House Republicans Call for Tougher Controls to
Keep U.S. Tech from China, Wall St. J. (Oct. 25, 2021), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/house-republicans-call-for-tougher-controls-to-keep-u-s-tech-from-china-11635159601 (describing
how certain lawmakers are pressuring the Commerce Department to fortify export controls to curb China’s access U.S.
technology).
27
See id.
28
Gregorian, supra note 25.
29
Id.
21
22
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hack in November 2020, IPVM revealed that the
company’s surveillance tactics were extremely
invasive and included race-based tracking.30
The United States’ limited actions toward addressing
China’s treatment of the Uyghurs—minimal
restrictions and public statements—violates its
legal obligations under the Convention. In 1988,
the United States ratified the Convention,31 which
defines what constitutes as genocide and outlines
the obligations of State Parties.32 Article V of the
Convention stipulates States Parties must “enact, in
accordance with their respective Constitutions, the
necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of
the present Convention.”33 Additionally, Article III(e)
includes punishing “complicity in genocide,” 34 which
is defined as whether genocide was a foreseeable
result of a country’s actions.35 The International
Court of Justice has previously held other countries
liable under Article III(e), including Serbia for its
failure to prevent the Srebrenica genocide.36

See Hong, supra note 10 (explaining the tracking technology
records traits such as beards, clothing, and emotional states that
the company designates as “normal, anger, disgust, fear, [and]
confused . . . ”).
31
US Ratifies Genocide Convention, U.S. Holocaust Mem’l
Museum, https://www.ushmm.org/learn/timeline-of-events/
after-1945/us-ratifies-genocide-convention.
32
See Genocide Convention, supra note 15, art. 2 (defining
genocide as “any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial,
or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group; € Forcibly transferring children of the group
to another group”).
33
Id.
34
Id., art. 3.
35
Daniel M. Greenfield, The Crime of Complicity in Genocide:
How the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and
Yugoslavia Got it Wrong, and Why it Matters, 98 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 921, 921 (2007-2008).
36
See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. &
Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. (Feb. 26).
30
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For years, the United States has foregone enacting the
necessary legislation that would regulate domestic
companies for their role in perpetuating genocidal
acts abroad. By not doing so, the United States is
ignoring its binding duty to legislatively prevent
the aiding and abetting of the Uyghur genocide
by prohibiting U.S. businesses from continuing
to aid Chinese surveillance companies.37 In some
cases, the connections between U.S. businesses
and Chinese surveillance companies may be clear;
some Chinese companies even list U.S. businesses
as partners on their websites.38 In other cases, there
is strong circumstantial evidence of a connection
between U.S. companies and Chinese surveillance.39
These associations are problematic because they are
significantly advancing the Chinese government’s
ability to surveil Uyghur communities.40

II. The Solution

To uphold international obligations under the
Convention and to halt the United States’ role in
contributing to the ongoing genocide, the United
States must take steps to further regulate and restrict
exports on surveillance technology and software.41
China relies on technology from U.S. corporations
and, without it, its surveillance program on the
Uyghurs would lose their effectiveness or even
collapse.42
Other governing regional bodies, such as countries
in the European Union (EU), have begun regulating
Lindsay Gorman & Matt Schrader, U.S. Firms Are Helping
Build China’s Orwellian State, Foreign Pol’y (Mar. 19, 2019),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/19/962492-orwell-china-socialcredit-surveillance/.
38
Id.
39
China has collected blood samples of hundreds of Uyghurs,
trying to use U.S. technology to convert the DNA sample into
an image of the person’s face. This is technology that has been
developing in the United States to produce pictures of criminal suspects to aid law enforcement. Sui-Lee Wee and Paul
Mozur, China Uses DNA to Map Faces, with Help from the
West, New York Times (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/12/03/business/china-dna-uighurs-xinjiang.html.
40
Id.
41
Ward, supra note 11.
42
Id.
37
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technological exports in the interest of international
human rights, and China has felt the impact. These
regulations have successfully allowed the EU to
scrutinize and limit exports of specific technologies
that the EU believes China will use to violate
human rights.43 These regulations also provide
clear guidance to businesses, putting them on
notice of the sanctions for illegally exporting such
technology.44 While this is a positive starting point,
there remain significant gaps in this framework.45 For
instance, European companies can navigate around
the regulations by receiving broad and elusive
descriptions from Chinese companies about the
exports’ intended use.46 Therefore, the United States
must determine if the EU regulations go far enough,
and develop its own, more specific regulations
accordingly.
In addition to mirroring and improving on the
EU’s framework, the United States Department of
Commerce should regulate technological exports
by placing certain Chinese companies on the
Department’s Entity List,47 which must include strict
enforcement and use technology-neutral criteria48
within the legislation.49 Many administrations
utilize the Entity List as a punitive measure against
states perpetuating human rights abuses; most
See EU to Limit Tech Exports to Hong Kong after Chinese
Clampdown, Reuters (July 24, 2020), 2 (discussing the EU
implemented regulations to support Hong Kong’s autonomy
because China was imposing a sweeping national security law
to secure the territory).
44
Id.
45 See generally Out of Control: Failing EU Laws for Digital
Surveillance Export, Amnesty Int’l (Sept. 20, 2020), https://
www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/EUR0125562020ENGLISH.pdf (reporting gaps in international law
framework due to narrow regulations).
46
Id. at 30.
47
This action is what republicans in U.S. Congress has been
pushing for. See O’Keeffee, supra note 26.
48
These criteria would not mention a specific type of technology that should be regulated, but instead focus on any technology’s end use.
49
Entity List, U.S. Dep’t. of Com., Bureau of Indus. & Sec.,
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/listsof-parties-of-concern/entity-list (last visited Nov. 22, 2021)
(explaining how companies are placed on entity lists, the review
policies for entity lists, and the exceptions to the Entity List).
43
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notably, the Trump administration placed Chinese
semiconductor companies on the list by banning
the export of U.S. technology to these entities unless
certain conditions are met.50
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law by implementing export regulation on these
technologies.52 Until sales are regulated, the United
States will continue to perpetuate China’s atrocity
crimes against the Uyghurs.

The United States should extend this blacklist
to a broader list of Chinese surveillance and AI
companies and should implement legislation to
secure the regulation’s longevity and effectiveness.
Specifically, instead of basing its criteria of who
should be regulated around the definition of
“cyber surveillance technologies” on technical
specifications, the United States should opt for
a technology-neutral approach, which does not
specifically regulate any type of technology and
instead focuses on the export’s intended end-use.
Relevant considerations should include whether
the technology is being used in connection with
international human rights violations or designed to
enable covert and non-covert surveillance of digital
systems to monitor, extract, collect or analyze data.
Regulation should account for the reality that many
forms of technology can collect data. This type of
regulation would cover a broad range of current and
future technologies that pose a risk to human rights,
thus allowing the United States to comply with its
international obligations.

III. Conclusion

While the U.S. government has verbally condemned
China for genocidal acts against the Uyghurs,
its denunciations are meaningless if the U.S.
government continues to allow U.S. companies to sell
technology to China that enable atrocities against the
Uyghurs.51 The United States must follow the EU’s
lead and be held accountable to binding international

Gorman & Schrader, supra note 37.
Margaret Besheet, At UN: 39 Countries Condemn China’s
Abuses of Uighurs, Voice of Am. News (Oct. 6, 2020), https://
www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/voa-news-china/un-39countries-condemn-chinas-abuses-uighurs.
50
51

EU Companies Selling Surveillance Tools to China’s Human
Rights Abusers, Amnesty Int’l (Sep. 21, 2020), https://www.
amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/09/eu-surveillance-sales-china-human-rights-abusers/.
52
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Knowingly
Benefitting:
Blocking Relief for
DRC Child Cobalt
Miners
by Austin Clements*

John Doe I v. Apple, Inc., a recently decided1 class
action lawsuit in the District Court for the District of
Columbia, sought to hold multinational corporations
liable for labor abuses that exist within the cobalt
supply chain in consumer electronics products.2
Extractive industries in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) are a prevalent site of human rights
abuses and exploitation and, in many ways, are a
relic of the DRC’s colonial past.3 Artisanal mining in
the country has led to increasingly dangerous
working conditions for miners and a rise in the use
of child labor to mine cobalt for electronics, such as
cell phones, electric cars, and laptops.4 Artisanal
* Austin Clements is a J.D. Candidate at American University
Washington College of Law. He is a Deputy Editor for the Human
Rights Brief and a Junior Staff Writer for the Journal of Gender,
Social Policy, and the Law.
1
While this article was being written, this case was dismissed in
the D.C. District. See John Doe I et al. v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:19-cv03737 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 2021). A timely appeal has been filed with
the D.C. Circuit Court.
2
Amended Complaint at 1-2, Jane Doe I v. Apple Inc., No. 1:1903737 (D.D.C. June 6, 2020) [hereinafter Amended Complaint].
3
Accord Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo: From
Leopold to Kabila (2002); Jason K. Stearns, Dancing in
the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and
the Great War of Africa (2011); Adam Hochschild, King
Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism
in Colonial Africa (1998) (accounting historical exploitation
of the mineral, human, and other natural resources by colonial
powers that transitioned from foreign colonial state control to
foreign private corporate ownership.)
4
Is My Phone Powered by Child Labour?, Amnesty Int’l,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/06/drc-cobalt-child-labour/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2021).
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mining is informal mining that is carried out using
primitive tools in largely unsupervised zones without
safety equipment.5 Often in these zones, tunnel
collapses and child labor are rampant.6 However, the
plaintiffs fell short of proving the burden required
under U.S. law to show that they could recover
damages from the defendants, which begs the
question of whether plaintiffs can recover at all from
U.S. based corporations for supply chain abuses
committed abroad.
In John Doe I, the plaintiffs filed a claim against five
tech giants—Alphabet, Apple, Dell, Microsoft, and
Tesla—for violations under the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA).7 The
plaintiffs alleged that the companies knowingly
benefitted from participation in a venture, which
engaged in child labor, thus violating the plaintiffs’
rights.8 For a claim under the TVPRA to prevail, the
plaintiffs must prove: (a) the companies knew or
should have known child labor was being used; (b)
with this knowledge defendants continued to
participate in a venture; (c) the defendants knowingly
benefitted from the participation in the venture; and
(d) the child plaintiffs were subjected to child labor.9
The corporate defendants acquired cobalt from
Glencore and Umicore and Huayou Cobalt, which
operate mines and artisanal mining zones (AMZs) in
the DRC.10 The plaintiffs allege that in the AMZs
they were injured as children, which squares the
fundamental legal question of whether a U.S.-based
corporation be held liable for human rights abuses
that occur in its opaque supply chain right in the
middle of the plaintiffs’ claim.

John Doe I v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-03737, *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 2,
2021).
6
Id.
7
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.).
8
Amended Complaint at 4.
9
John Doe I v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-03737, at *20.
10
Our evolving approach to ASM: a plan for co-existence and
transformation, Glencore (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.glencore.com/media-and-insights/insights/our-evolving-approachto-artisanal-small-scale-mining.
5

